Breaking Women\u27s Silence in Law:  The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning by Finley, Lucinda M.
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1989 
Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered 
Nature of Legal Reasoning 
Lucinda M. Finley 
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles 
 Part of the Law and Gender Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal 
Reasoning, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 886 (1989). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/194 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the
Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning
Lucinda M Finley*
Such is the dilemma of the woman speaker. That the categories of
patriarchal language distort what she might like to say is no longer in
question. Whether she is a literary critic or theorist, poet, linguist,
philosopher, sociologist, or natural scientist [or lawyer], the formali-
ties of her discipline, the syntax of its proper practice, the canons of its
acceptable style have been exposed as carrying the sexist reasoning it
is her task to replace .... Once conceptualized in traditional catego-
ries, feminist protest may already have capitulated to the political or-
der reflected in disciplinary structures. Concepts such as "utility" and
"rights" . . . may not be usable by feminists when it is understood that
such terms belong, and have their meaning, within a bourgeois society
founded on a view of "man" and "man's place" which is
unacceptable. I
Law reaches every silent space. It invades the secrecy of women's
wombs. It breaks every silence, uttering itself. Law-language, juris-
diction. It defines. It commands. It forces. 2
The starting point of feminist work must be found in women's lives
and not in legal definitions.3
Language matters. Law matters. Legal language matters.
I make these three statements not to offer a clever syllogism, but to
bluntly put the central thesis of this. Article: it is an imperative task for
feminist jurisprudence and for feminist lawyers-for anyone concerned
about what the impact of law has been, and will be, on the realization and
meanings of justice, equality, security, and autonomy for women-to
turn critical attention to the nature of legal reasoning and the language
by which it is expressed. As I exhorted in a recent article, feminist legal
theorists "must start to grapple with the nature of law itself, to under-
stand the extent to which it is male defined, and the extent to which its
language and its process of reasoning are built on male conceptions of
problems and of harms-and on male, or epistemologically 'objective'
and 'neutral,' methods of analysis. If the law has been defined largely by
* Visiting Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School. I thank the Victorian Society for Legal
Philosophy, Melbourne, Australia, which provided a most stimulating and supportive initial forum
for the articulation of the ideas that became this Article. I am also grateful for the helpful comments
I received when presenting a draft of this Article at the Clara Brett Martin Workshop, University of
Toronto Law School; to faculty workshops at Syracuse Law School and University of Ottawa Law
School; to the Graduate Group for Feminist Studies at SUNY Buffalo; and at the Notre Dame Law
Review Symposium. I would also like to particularly thank Rosemary Coombe, Hester Eisenstein, Jen-
nifer Nedelsky, Robert Rodes, and Elizabeth Sheehy for their thoughtful readings and comments.
1 Nye, Woman Clothed With the Sun: Julia Kristeva and the Escape From/To Language, 12 SIGNs: J.
WOMEN IN CULT. & Soc'v 664, 665, 671 (1987).
2 Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law, 13 NOVA L.J.
355, 355 (1989) (herinafter Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching).
3 Introduction to Special Issue: Feminist Perspectives on Law, 14 INT'LJ. Soc. OF L. 233 (1986).
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men, and if its definitions, which are presumed to be objective and neu-
tral, shape societal judgments as to whether a problem exists or whether
a harm has occurred, then can the law comprehend and adequately re-
dress women's experiences of harm?" 4 This Article is my effort to take
up my own call, and to push beyond my beginning reflections in the pre-
vious article.
I. Why We Must Think About the Power and Limitations
of the Legal Voice
Language, and the thoughts that it expresses, is socially constructed
and socially constituting. Rather than being neutral or naturally or-
dained, it reflects the world views and chosen meanings of those who
have had power to affect definitions and create terms. The selected
terms and meanings then shape our understandings of what things are,
of the way the world is. 5 Careful attention to the language we use can
reveal hidden but powerful assumptions framing the way people think
about the world. The persistence of the language then entrenches the
way of thinking that it expresses. For example, the fact that we need to
have modifiers such as "working" or "single" or "welfare" for the sup-
posedly neutral term "mother" signifies that our cultural understanding
of the unadorned word "mother" is a woman who is married, being sup-
ported by her husband, and not working outside the home. This is the
norm for "mothers"-all other types of mothers are subtly deviant.6
Similarly, the use of the term "minorities" to refer to people who actually
collectively are the great majority of people in the world reflects and re-
inforces the deep and pernicious assumption in Western societies that
white people are the norm for humanity.7 Moreover, the usual conjunc-
tion "women and minorities" suggests that although linked, the two
terms are also exclusive of each other. This use of language not only
reflects and reinforces the white male norm, but also signifies and rein-
forces the view that "women" means white women and "minorities"
means "men who are not white."8 Women of color are thus signified as
twice removed from the norm, as all the more problematic, as slipping
4 Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism Unmodified, 82
Nw. U.L. REV. 352, 384 (1988) (hereinafter Finley, Nature of Domination).
5 Examples of works that develop these points are F. JAMESON, PRISON-HOUSE OF LANGUAGE; A
CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF STRUCTURALISM AND RUSSIAN FORMALISM (1972); G. LAKOFF, METAPHORS WE
LIVE By (1980); R. LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMEN'S PLACE (1975); D. SPENDER, MAN MADE LAN-
GUAGE (2d ed. 1985). Indeed, within structuralist linguistics and anthropology, the term "language"
"is used to mean not simply words or even a vocabulary and set of grammatical rules, but rather, a
meaning constituting system: that is, any system-strictly verbal or other-through which meaning is
constructed and cultural practices organized and by which, accordingly, people represent and under-
stand their world." Scott, Deconstructing Equality Versus Difjerence: Or, The Uses of Poststructuralist Theory
for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33, 34 (1988) (hereinafter Scott, Deconstructing Equality).
6 G. LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE
MIND 80-81 (1987).
7 See Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 13 n.16 (1987),
8 The title of the anthology about black women's studies, ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, AND ALL
THE BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF US ARE BRAVE (G. Hull, P. Scott & B. Smith, eds. 1982), reflects
the absence of women of color from the usual terminology "women and minorities."
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into invisibility.9 Similarly, the term "gender" is too often taken to be a
shorthand for "women." The body of law about gender discrimination is
widely understood to involve "women's issues" -thus reinforcing the
understanding that "man" is a genderless, standard creature who does
not have to concern himself with gender issues.' 0 Given the way in which
language creates meaning through differentiation, with "man" as the
linguisitic stand-in for "generically human," "women," "women's is-
sues," and "women's perspectives" are understood as partial, both in the
sense of being incomplete and being biased."I
Law is, among other things, a language, a form of discourse,' 2 and a
system through which meanings are reflected and constructed and cul-
tural practices organized. Law is a language of power,' 3 a particularly
authoritative discourse. Law can pronounce definitively what something
is or is not and how a situation or event is to be understood. The con-
cepts, categories, and terms that law uses, and the reasoning structure by
which it expresses itself, organizes its practices, and constructs its mean-
ings, has a particularly potent ability to shape popular and authoritative
understandings of situations. Legal language does more than express
thoughts. It reinforces certain world views and understandings of
events. Its terms and its reasoning structure are the procrustean bed into
which supplicants before the law must express their needs. Through its
definitions and the way it talks about events, law has the power to silence
alternative meanings-to suppress other stories.
For example, the terminology used in the infamous Baby M case of
"surrogate" mother, rather than "birth mother" or "gestational
mother," expresses and entrenches a preference for viewing the situation
contractually. The terminology removes the birth mother from the expe-
rience of pregnancy and nurturing and turns her into a mere participant
in a business matter, an at arm's length transaction with a definite end
point to her position as "surrogate." Thus, the media, legal scholars,
and law students hotly debated whether a child was an appropriate item
of contract, and whether the contract should be specifically enforced.
9 For discussions of how this presents seemingly intractable difficulties for anti-discrimination
law to address the undivided realities of women of color, see Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Consti-
tution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989); Scarborough, Con-
ceptualizing Black Women's Employment Experiences, 98 YALE LJ. 1457 (1989); Austin, Sapphire Unbound
(1988) (unpublished manuscript).
10 For example, I have often wondered why so few men take law school courses denominated as
about gender. I have occasionally asked some male students this question, and they look quite sur-
prised at being asked as they explain to me that such courses have nothing to do with them.
11 See, eg., J. SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 174 (1988).
12 The term "discourse" as used in poststructuralist theory, especially as developed in the work
of Michel Foucault, "is not a language or a text but a historically, socially, and institutionally specific
structure of statements, terms, categories, and beliefs. Foucault suggests that the elaboration of
meaning involves conflict and power, that.., the power to control a particular field resides in claims
to (scientific) knowledge embodied not only in writing but also in disciplinary and professional orga-
nizations, in institutions . . . , and in social relationships .... Discourse is thus contained or ex-
pressed in organizations and institutions as well as words; all of these constitute texts or documents
to be read." Scott, supra note 5, at 35.
13 Cf Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601 (1986) (the power of the word of law is also
a form of violence, particularly when the power is being exercised upon those whose perspectives
and experiences have not informed or been heard in the legal definitions).
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Distorted and lost in this debate was Mary Beth Whitehead's understand-
ing of the experience of pregnancy. Her efforts to express her powerful,
complex feelings for her child were hardly excuses for breaking a con-
tract, in the view of the trial judge. 14
Another example of the power of legal pronouncements to shape
public understandings is provided by the much discussed recent case of
Tawana Brawley.' 5 The grand jury's conclusion, orchestrated by the spe-
cial prosecutor, that Tawana Brawley was not the victim of a criminal
sexual assault by four white men has shaped people's understanding that
"nothing happened."' 16 The legal pronouncement is deemed definitive
of what happened. Few stop to think that when a young black woman in
a racist society is found in a garbage bag after being reported as missing
for several days, dazed, and her naked body smeared with racial slurs
written in feces, "nothing" is not what happened. Whether she herself
or someone else put her in that bag in that condition, something, and
something quite drastic, certainly happened. And now that the law has
pronounced "what happened," Tawana's own story, and the story of
blacks who saw in the event the need to express outrage, either will never
be heard, or can now be dismissed as "not true." The law,-with its lim-
ited (time-wise and conduct-wise) concern over a narrow set of explana-
tions, has authoritatively shaped the understanding of the event as being
only about whether on a particular day she was the victim of a particular
form of illegal abuse. It is not relevant in the language of the law, and so
it is "nothing" to us, that she might have been driven to the act to escape
and to draw attention to other forms of abuse she was suffering, such as
abuse by her stepfather or the abuse of being a black woman in this
society.
Another example is the law's appropriation of the word "discrimina-
tion," which means to differentiate, to make a distinction in favor of or
against a person or thing because of a group characteristic rather than
individual merit. Much of the political, historical, and moral content of
"equality" has been dropped with this term. An understanding of the
role of power, domination, and oppression as the source of the evil of
making "discriminations" recedes into the neutralized word "discrimina-
tion." Thus we come to understand any race-based distinction, no mat-
ter what its historical impetus and purpose, and no matter whether it
14 See Ashe, Law-Language of Maternity: Discourse Holding Nature in Contempt, 22 NEw ENG. L. REV.
521 (1988) (hereinafter Ashe, Law-Language of Maternity).
15 For an account of the case and an important perspective on its cultural meaning, see Omo-
lade, Black Women, Black Men, and Tawana Brawl&y-The Shared Condition, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 11
(1989).
16 Several friends and family members with whom I discussed the case used the terminology
"nothing happened" to describe the grand jury's conclusion that no indictment was warranted. This
tendency to equate the legal judgment that there is insufficient evidence of a particular crime with
"nothing [that we need to care about] happened" is also reflected in comments I have heard rape
victims make after a prosecutor declines to prosecute or a jury fails to convict: "Oh dear, I guess
that means people think nothing happened." Cf R. WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS.
REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING, AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE (1988), discussed
infra, text accompanying notes 100-03.
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contributes to or helps reduce domination and oppression, to be forbid-
den discrimination.1 7
Legal terminology does more than simply reflect prevailing ways of
thinking about situations. An important aspect of its power is the fact
that changes in how a situation is characterized can affect how the law
approaches and resolves it. Whether the Baby M case is called a contract
dispute or a custody dispute affects more than how we think about the
situation. The choice of characterization can affect the legal outcome
and profoundly alter the lives of all the people involved. As Martha
Fineman has perceptively demonstrated in her analysis of the discourse
governing child custody decisionmaking,' 8 the shift from the legal rheto-
ric of divorce and terminating the parental relationship, to the helping
rhetoric of social work which emphasizes restructuring the family rela-
tionship, has had a major impact on custody disputes and on mothers'
rights and abilities to reconstruct their lives after divorce. The mothers'
perspective about the significance of past parenting behavior has become
a voice silenced and ignored by the new dominant legal rhetoricians.
Another significant feature of legal language is its conservatism. By
always referring back to what has previously been defined, by building on
precedent, legal language tends to stabilize and reflect the status quo,
rather than to reach for radical understandings. Understandings that do
not neatly match the existing definitions are suspect as radical, unthink-
able, unexpressable, and unreachable by legal language. 19
Because legal reasoning and the language by which it is expressed
have the power to construct and contain individual and cultural under-
standings of situations and social relationships, they can inhibit change.
In light of this power, those who seek to use law to help empower and
positively change the status of a group such as women must, in their the-
ory and practice, be concerned with the origins, nature, and structure of
legal language and legal reasoning. To tame the beast you must know
the beast. Thus, a crucial project for feminist jurisprudence must be to
ask constantly and critically who has been involved in shaping law, in
selecting and defining its terms, and in deciding what is and is not one of
those terms. Whose understandings, philosophy, and world view are im-
printed on law? Consequently, how neutral and how inclusive is the
structure of legal reasoning?
I regard this critical inquiry into the nature of legal reasoning and
language as a connecting bridge between the supposedly dichotomous
worlds of theory and practice. Feminist jurisprudential theory can in-
form lawyers concerned with using law to achieve equality and autonomy
for women-and with infusing law with more of women's (and more wo-
17 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
18 Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmak-
ing, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988).
19 An example, discussed infra note 23 and accompanying text, is the effort by some feminists to
replace the existing definition of obscenity with a definition of pornography which focuses on harm
to women. Courts have rejected this new definition precisely because it does not fit the existing
definition of obscenity. See American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986); see also Finley, The Nature of Domination, supra note 4.
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men's) understanding(s) of these contested terms. The insights offered
by feminist theory into epistemology and the patriarchal nature of law,
and its conclusions about the pros and cons of appropriating existing
legal meanings and trying to make the unchanged terms fit women's ex-
periences, can provide creative guidance to lawyers. Feminist theorists
who are interested in epistemological issues, in power and the way it is
perpetuated, and in deconstructing dichotomies such as equal-
ity/difference that seem to disempower women, can gain insight from the
experiences of feminist lawyers. At times, these lawyers have found
themselves constrained by the power of legal discourse and have tried to
alter the meaning of legal terms, such as sex discrimination, self-defense,
and rape. At other times these lawyers have used successfully liberal
legal frameworks such as "arguing about equality means arguing about
sameness/difference." Those of us who practice and think law primarily
by writing and teaching about it, as well as those who practice and think
law primarily by litigating, lobbying, counseling, and negotiating about
it, must reflect about what it is that we are buying into when we use the
existing terms of law and wholly accept the existing constructs of its rea-
soning. How will the legal language shape, confine, constrain, or direct
our aspirations and our understandings of our situation? Will the ex-
isting terms and their embedded meanings inescapably cabin or under-
mine our goals? This is a necessary subject of reflection if we are to deal
with why it seems to be so hard for women to fit their experiences within
legal language. Why do so many efforts to use existing legal terms and
doctrines, such as equality, privacy, discrimination, and civil rights, wind
up being unsuccessful? 20 Why do those efforts sometimes lead to per-
verse unanticipated results? 2' Why on other occasions do they get us
into stalled or circular debates, such as "equal treatment/special treat-
ment," 22 or "regulate pornography/protect the first amendment," 23 that
do not capture either the nature of the problem to be addressed or the
shared goals and concerns of many of the debaters? If we do not think
about what produces the frequent sense of one step forward-two steps
back when we try to use law to affect change for women, but just go on
grabbing at the existing language, we are unlikely to tap any positive po-
tential in law as a source of beneficial social change for women or other
disempowered, silenced, marginalized people.
20 The initial legal challenges to the exclusion of pregnancy from employers' disability insurance
plans is one example.
21 The adverse economic effects of the equality movement in divorce reform on women is a
compelling example. See L. WErIZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); Fineman, Implementing
Equality: Ideology, Contradiction & Social Change-A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the
Consequences of Divorce, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 789; Marcus, Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections on the History
of Divorce Reform in New York State, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 395 (1989).
22 See Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986) (hereinafter Finley, Transcending Equality).
23 Compare Catherine MacKinnon's efforts to make pornography actionable harm, see C. MAC-
KINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987), with the Feminist Anti-Cen-
sorship Task Force (F.A.C.T.) opposition to her ordinance. Brief Amicus Curiae of F.A.C.T.,
American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), reprinted
in 21 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 69 (1988).
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II. The Gendered Nature of Legal Language Is What Makes it
Powerful and Limited
A. Why Law is a Gendered (Male) Language
Throughout the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence, the pri-
mary linguists of law have almost exclusively been men-white, edu-
cated, economically privileged men. 24 Men have shaped it, they have
defined it, they have interpreted it and given it meaning consistent with
their understandings of the world and of people "other" than them. As
the men of law have defined law in their own image, law has excluded or
marginalized the voices and meanings of these "others. ' 25 Indeed, there
have even been evidentiary rules of law that forbade, or declared unwor-
thy of belief without "objective" corroboration, the testimony of women
or blacks. 26 Law, along with all the other accepted academic disciplines,
has exalted one form of reasoning and called only this form "reason."
Because the men of law have had the societal power not to have to worry
too much about the competing terms and understandings of "others,"
they have been insulated from challenges to their language and have thus
come to see it as natural, inevitable, complete, objective, and neutral.27
Thus, legal language and reasoning is gendered, and that gender
matches the male gender of its linguistic architects. 28 Law is a patriarchal
24 Even the recent entry into law of nonwhite men and women and white women has consisted of
people schooled in, and indoctrinated with, the language and reasoning constructs of the white men
who defined law and all other exalted disciplines of study. It has only been as some of these new
entrants have tapped into theoretical sources, including experience and feeling, that challenge the
white men's language/theory system that changes in law other than demographic changes or small
doctrinal expansions have started to be discussed actively and to seem possible. See Menkel-
Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 29 (1987).
25 Id.
26 See L. White, Unearthing the Barriers to Women's Speech: Notes Toward a Feminist Sense of
Procedural Justice (1988) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Feminism and Legal Theory
Conference on Women and Power, University of Wisconsin Law School and Institute for Legal Stud-
ies, Madison, Wisconsin) (forthcoming in 38 BUFFALO L. REV. (1990)).
27 The critique of objectivity and neutrality as not what they claim to be but as partial, male-
biased perspectives is a standard and crucial part of current feminist theory that has moved beyond
being merely reformist to challenging the foundations of disciplines. I have developed it elsewhere,
see Finley, Transcending Equality, supra note 22; and Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search
for GenderJustice, 96 YALE L.J. 914 (1987) (hereinafter Finley, Choice and Freedom). In feminist legal
theory, its best known expositor, and one of the first to promote it, is Catherine MacKinnon. See
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULT.
& Soc'y 515 (1982) (hereinafter SIGNS I); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULT. & Soc'Y 635 (1983) (hereinafter SIGNS II); see also
C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 23. For examples from other disciplines, see C.
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); S.
HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986) (hereinafter S. HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUES-
TION); A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983).
28 Some linguistic theorists have posited, compellingly I believe, that all language, as we cur-
rently know it, is male. See D. SPENDER, supra note 5. Consequently, some feminist theorists say that
in order to escape patriarchy, women need to create a new language all their own, emanating from
their bodies/embodied selves. See, e.g., M. DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY, THE META-ETHICS OF RADICAL FEM-
INISM (1978). Consider also French feminist theorists such as Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. See
NEw FRENCH FEMINISMS: AN ANTHOLOGY (I. de Courtivron & E. Marks eds. 1981).
[Vol. 64:886
GENDERED NATURE OF LEGAL REASONING
form of reasoning,29 as is the philosophy of liberalism of which law (or at
least post-Enlightenment Anglo-American law) is a part.30
The claim that legal language and reasoning is male gendered is
partly empirical and historical. The legal system and its reasoning struc-
ture and language have been framed on the basis of life experiences typi-
cal to empowered white males. Law's reasoning structure shares a great
deal with the assumptions of the liberal intellectual and philosophical tra-
dition, which historically has been framed by men.31 The reasoning
structure of law is thus congruent with the patterns of socialization, expe-
rience, and values of a particular group of privileged, educated men. Ra-
tionality, abstraction, a preference for statistical and empirical proofs
over experiential or anecdotal evidence, and a conflict model of social
life corresponds to how these men have been socialized and educated to
think, live, and work.
My claim that legal reasoning and language are patriarchal also has a
normative component, in the sense that male-based perspectives, images,
and experiences are often taken to be the norms in law. Privileged white
men are the norm for equality law;32 they are the norm for assessing the
reasonable person in tort law; 33 the way men would react is the norm for
self-defense law;34 and the male worker is the prototype for labor law.35
By calling legal reasoning and language male, or patriarchal, I am
not making a biologic-essentialist argument. I am not saying that only,
or all, persons of the male sex talk and think this way, nor that this is
inherently always the language and reasoning persons of the male sex
will use. Indeed, because it is a powerful and often useful way of reason-
ing, many women have become adept at it and willingly wield the tools of
the powerful male tradition. Rather, legal language is a male language
because it is principally informed by men's experiences and because it
derives from the powerful social situation of men, relative to women.
Universal and objective thinking is male language because intellectually,
economically, and politically privileged men have had the power to ig-
nore other perspectives and thus to come to think of their situation as the
norm, their reality as reality, and their views as objective. Dis-
empowered, marginalized groups are far less likely to mistake their situa-
29 For developments of this theme, see Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLI-
TICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 294 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and
Patriarchy, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 83 (1980).
30 One of the best critiques of liberalism as a patriarchal form of reasoning is A. JAGGAR, supra
note 27.
31 Women did not begin to enter the universities in which this tradition was developed and
entrenched until the end of the nineteenth century. See, e.g., B. SOLOMON, IN THE COMPANY OF EDU-
CATED WOMEN: A HISTORY OF WOMEN AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1985).
32 See infra text accompanying note 55.
33 See Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Finley, A
Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989) (herein-
after Finley, A Break in the Silence).
34 See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977); Schneider, Equal Rights to
Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623 (1980).
35 See, e.g., Conaghan, The Invisibility of Women in Labour Law: Gender-Neutrality in Model-Building, 14
INT'LJ. SOC. OF L. 377 (1986).
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tion, experience, and views as universal. 36 Male reasoning is dualistic
and polarized thinking because men have been able, thanks to women, to
organize their lives in a way that enables them not to have to see such
things as work and family as mutually defining. Men have acted on their
fears of women and nature to try to split nature off from culture, body
from mind, passion from reason, and reproduction from production.3 7
Men have had the power to privilege-to assign greater value to-the
side of the dichotomies that they associate with themselves. Conflict-ori-
ented thinking, seeing matters as involving conflicts of interests or rights,
as contrasted to relational thinking, is male because this way of expres-
sing things is the primary orientation of more men than women.38 The
fact that there are many women trained in and adept at male thinking and
legal language does not turn it into androgynous language-it simply
means the women have learned male language, as many French speakers
learn English.39
The claim that law is patriarchal does not mean that women have not
been addressed or comprehended by law. Women have obviously been
the subjects or contemplated targets of many laws. But it is men's under-
standing of women, women's nature, women's capacities, and women's
experiences-women refracted through the male eye-rather than wo-
men's own definitions, that has informed law.40 As Robin West said in
analyzing "masculine jurisprudence:"
[T]he distinctive values women hold, the distinctive dangers from
which we suffer, and the distinctive contradictions that characterize
our inner lives are not reflected in legal theory because legal theory
(whatever else it's about) is about actual, real life, enacted, legislated,
adjudicated law, and women have, from law's inception, lacked the
power to make law protect, value, or seriously regard our experience.
Jurisprudence is "masculine" because jurisprudence is about the rela-
tionship between human beings and the laws we actually have, and the
laws we actually have are "masculine" both in terms of their intended
beneficiaries and in authorship. Women are absent from jurispru-
dence because women as human beings are absent from the law's protec-
tion: jurisprudence does not recognize us because law does not
protect us. 4 1
One notable example of a male judicial perspective characterizing
women as men see them is the often-flayed U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Bradwell v. Illinois,42 in which Justice Bradley exalted the delicate timid-
36 See N. HARTSOCK, RETHINKING MODERNISM: MINORITY VERSUS MAJORITY THEORIES, CULTURAL
CRITIQUE No.7 187, 205 (1987); Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness asJurispru-
dential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1987).
37 See, e.g., S. GRIFFIN, WOMAN AND NATURE: THE ROARING INSIDE HER (1978).
38 This is why Gilligan calls the rights-based ethic the male voice, and the care-based ethic the
female voice. She, too, disclaims biological determinism. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 27.
39 Many women law students with whom I have talked have expressed their alienation from the
discipline of law and their feelings of being silenced or not heard in law school as analogous to the
situation of being forced to become bilingual in a world where those with the power to choose
whether to listen speak only one language, and thus the person forced to learn the new language
fears the loss of their native tongue.
40 This point is further developed in MacKinnon, SIGNS II, supra note 27.
41 WestJurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 60 (1988) (emphasis in original).
42 83 U.S. 442 (1873).
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ity and biologically bounded condition of women to conclude that wo-
men were unfit for the rude world of law practice. Another example is
the decision in Geduldig v. Aiello, 43 in which the Court cordoned off the
female experience of pregnancy and called this experience unique, vol-
untary, and unrelated in any way to the workplace. '
The legal definition of rape provides another example of the male
judicial perspective. It is the male's view of whether the woman con-
sented that is determinative of consent; it is men's view of what consti-
tutes force against men and forms of resistence by men in situations
other than rape that defines whether force has been used against a wo-
man and a woman has resisted; it is men's definition of sex-penetration
of the vagina by the penis-rather than women's experience of sexual-
ized violation and violation that defines the crime. 44 The legal view of
prostitution as a crime committed by women (and more recently also
committed by men playing the woman's role in a sexual encounter with
men) with no "victims" is another obvious example. The word "family"
and the area of "family law" is yet another example. The norm of "fam-
ily," the fundamental meaning of the term embedded in and shaped by
law, is of a household headed by a man with a wife who is wholly or
somewhat dependent on him. Other forms of family-especially those
without a man-are regarded as abnormal. To a significant extent, the
purpose of the discipline of family law is to sanction the formation of
ideal families and to control and limit the formation and existence of
these nonideal families, and thus to control the status and lives of
women.
B. The Power and Limitations of Male Legal Language
Analysis of the way the law structures thought and talk about social
problems is necessary to understand how the law can limit our under-
standings of the nature of problems and can confine our visions for
change. The analysis can also be instructive for suggesting strategies for
change. I have said above that a male-gendered way of thinking about
social problems is to speak in terms of objectivity, of universal abstrac-
tions, of dichotomy, and of conflict. These are essentially the ways law
talks about social problems.
Modem Anglo-American law talks about social problems within the
individualistic framework of patriarchal Western liberalism, a theory that
itself has been challenged by feminists as resting on a fundamentally
male world view.45 This framework sees humans as self-interested, fun-
damentally set-apart from other people, and threatened by interactions
with others.46 To control the threat of those who would dominate you or
gain at your expense, you must strive to gain power over them. This
43 417 U.S. 484 (1973).
44 See, e.g., S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); MacKinnon, SIGNS II, supra note 27.
45 See, e.g., A. JAGGAR, supra note 27.
46 See S. HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION, supra note 27, at 171. See also N. HARTSOCK, MONEY,
SEX AND POWER: TOWARD A FEMINIST HISTORICAL MATERIALISM (1983); A. JAGGAR, supra note 45.
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power can easily become domination because the point of its exercise is
to protect yourself by molding another to your will.
As part of this individualistic framework, law is conceptualized as a
rule-bound system for adjudicating the competing rights of self-inter-
ested, autonomous, essentially equal individuals capable of making un-
constrained choices.47 Because of the law's individualistic focus, it sees
one of the central problems that it must address to be enforcing the
agreements made by free autonomous individuals, as well as enforcing a
few social norms to keep the battle of human life from getting out of
hand. It envisions another central task to be eliminating obvious con-
straints on individual choice and opportunity. The constraints are
thought to emanate primarily from the state or from the bad motivations
of other individuals. An individualistic focus on choice does not perceive
constraints as coming from history, from the operation of power and
domination, from socialization, or from class, race and gender. 48 A final
key task for individualistic liberal law is to keep the state from making
irrational distinctions between people, because such distinctions can
frustrate individual autonomy. It is not an appropriate task to alter struc-
tures and institutions, to help the disempowered overcome subordina-
tion, to eliminate fear and pain that may result from encounters
masquerading as "freely chosen," 49 to value nurturing connections, 50 or
to promote care and compassion for other people. 51
To keep its operation fair in appearance, which it must if people are
to trust resorting to the legal method for resolving competing claims, the
law strives for rules that are universal, objective, and neutral. The lan-
guage of individuality and neutrality keeps law from talking about values,
structures, and institutions, and about how they construct knowledge,
choice, and apparent possibilities for conducting the world. Also sub-
merged is a critical awareness of systematic, systemic, or institutional
power and domination. There are few ways to express within the lan-
guage of law and legal reasoning the complex relationship between
power, gender, and knowledge. 52 Yet in order for feminists to use the
law to help effectuate change, we must be able to talk about the connec-
tion between power and knowledge. This connection must be acknowl-
edged in order to demystify the "neutrality" of the law, to make the law
comprehend that women's definitions have been excluded and marginal-
47 For an insightful feminist critique of liberal legalism, see West, supra note 41.
48 See Finley, Choice and Freedom, supra note 27.
49 See, e.g., West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal
Theory, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (1987) (hereinafter West, Women's Hadonic Lives).
50 Tort law, for example, reluctantly and rarely allows recovery for emotional distress caused
when a loved one is injured.
51 See, e.g., Bender, supra note 33.
52 Cf S. HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION, supra note 27, in which Professor Harding suggests
that science may be particularly resistent to theorizing about gender because it is an empirical, posi-
tivistic discipline and consequently without a tradition of critical inquiry into the social origins of
conceptual systems and patterns of behavior, including the concepts and behaviors of scientific in-
quirers. Id. at 33. Law and science share many characteristics in this regard. Despite some tradition
of normative theorizing, law is essentially an empirical, positivistic discipline, dedicated, as is science,
to objective truth, rather than destabilizing critical inquiry.
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ized, and to show that the language of neutrality itself is one of the de-
vices for this silencing.
The language of neutrality and objectivity can silence the voices of
those who did not participate in its creation because it takes a distanced,
decontextualized stance. Within this langauge and reasoning system, al-
ternative voices to the one labeled objective are suspect as biased. An
explicit acknowledgement of history and the multiplicity of exper-
iences-which might help explode the perception of objectivity-is dis-
couraged. To talk 'openly about the interaction between historical
events, political change, and legal change is to violate neutral principles,
such as adherence to precedent-and precedents themselves are rarely
talked about as products of historical and social contingencies. For ex-
ample, in the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision declaring a municipal
affirmative action plan unconstitutional, City of Richmond v. Croson,53 the
majority talks in the language of neutrality, of color-blindness, and of
blind justice54-and it is the more classicly legal voice. The dissent,
which cries out in anguish about the lessons of history, power, and domi-
nation, is open to the accusation that it speaks in the language of politics
and passions, not law.
In legal language, experience and perspective are translated as bias,
as something that makes the achievement of neutrality more difficult.
Having no experience with or prior knowledge of something is equated
with perfect neutrality. This way of thinking is evident in jury selection.
A woman who has been raped would almost certainly be excluded as a
juror in a rape trial-it is assumed that her lived experience of rape
makes her unable to judge it objectively. Legal language cannot imagine
that her experience might give her a nuanced, critical understanding ca-
pable of challenging the male-constructed vision of the crime. Yet some-
one with no experience of rape, either as victim, perpetrator, or
solacer/supporter of victim, is deemed objective, even though it may be
just their lack of experience that leaves them prone to accept the biased
myths about women's behavior that surround this crime.
Because it is embedded in a patriarchal framework that equates ab-
straction and universalization from only one group's experiences as neu-
trality, legal reasoning views male experiences and perspectives as the
universal norm around which terms and entire areas of the law are de-
fined. Examples of this phenomenon abound, and exposing them has
been a central project of feminist jurisprudence. Thus, for example, my
previous work, as well as that of several others, 55 has examined how talk
about equality, couched in comparative language of same-
53 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
54 Speaking of the meaning of images conveyed by the use of language, the law's metaphor for
neutrality and justice-blindness-is a curious one considering the meaning of blindness in other
contexts. Rather than equating blindness with an objective, whole, universal view, in other language
systems blindness means not being able to fully comprehend, being partial because not all senses are
able to be employed. The parable of the blind men and the elephant, in which none can imagine the
whole, is illustrative of the usual connotation of blindness.
55 See, e.g., Finley, Transcending Equality, supra note 22; Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory,
48 U. Prr. L. REv. 1043 (1987); Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Diference: Bilingual and
Special Education, 48 LAw & CoNrEMP. PRODS., Spring 1985, at 157.
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ness/difference, requires a norm or standard for comparison-and that
norm becomes white males. The more a non-white person can be talked
about as the same as a white male, the more deserving she or he is to be
treated equally to, or the same as, white males. This language not only
uses white males as the reference-point, but it also exalts them. To be
the same as white males is the desired end. To be different from them is
undesirable and justifies disadvantage.
Many doctrinal areas of the law are also fundamentally structured
around men's perspectives and experiences. The field of labor law uses a
gendered meaning of work-as that which is done for wages outside your
own home-as its focus. Thus, any talk about reforming labor law, or
regulating work, will always leave unspoken, and thus unaffected, much
of what women do, even women who also "work" in the legal conven-
tional sense.56 Legal intervention in work-or the perception that no in-
tervention is needed-assumes that workers are men with wives at home
who tend to the necessities of life. It is only in this framework that we
can even think of work and family as separate and conflicting spheres. 57
Tort law defines injuries and measures compensation primarily in
relation to what keeps people out of work and what their work is worth. 58
It is in this framework that noneconomic damages, such as pain and suf-
fering or compensation for emotional injuries, which are often crucial
founts of recovery for women, are deemed suspect and expendable. In
the language of criminal law, the paradigmatic criminal is a male, and
women criminals are often viewed as doubly deviant.5 9 Another example
of the manifestation of the male reference-points is how self-defense law
looks to male notions of threat and response to assess what is reason-
able.60 Contract law is built around the form of transactions that pre-
dominates in the male-dominated marketplace, and doctrines that are
regarded as necessary to assist the weak (i.e., helpless women), such as
reliance and restitution, are subtly demeaned by the language as "excep-
tions," as deviations from the normal rules of contract.6 1 All of this sug-
gests that for feminist law reformers, even using the terms "equality,"
"work," "injury," "damages," "market," and "contract" can involve buy-
ing into, and leaving unquestioned, the male frames of reference. It also
leaves unspoken, and unrecognized, the kinds of work women do, or the
kinds of injuries women suffer.
56 For an analysis of the gendered nature of labor law, see Conaghan, supra note 35.
57 The paradigm of the male worker is also evident in the structure of the social security system.
See M. ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN-SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL
TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1988). It is also evident in the structure of unemployment insurance, which
regards family or reproductive reasons for disengaging from employment as voluntary quits or as
rendering a worker unavailable for work, as reasons to disqualify a worker from unemployment com-
pensation. See Pearce, Toil and Trouble: Women Workers and Unemployment Compensation, 10 SIGNS: J.
WOMEN IN CULT. & Soc'Y 439 (1985).
58 See Finley, A Break in the Silence, supra note 33.
59 See Chesney-Lind & Daly, Feminism and Criminology, 5JusT. Q. 497 (1987); Heidensohn, Models
ofJustice: Portia or Persephone? Some Thoughts on Equality, Fairness and Gender in the Field of CriminalJustice,
14 INT'LJ. Soc. OF L. 287 (1986).
60 See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977); Schneider, supra note 34.
61 See Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Frug, Re-
Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1065 (1985).
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The language of law is also a language of dichotomies, oppositions,
and conflict. No doubt this is partly attributable to the fact that law so
frequently is invoked in situations of conflict-it is called on to resolve
disputes, to respond to problems that are deemed to arise out of conflict-
ing interests. Another reason legal language is put in terms of opposing
interests is due to its place within an intellectual tradition-Western lib-
eral thought-that orders the world in dualisms: culture/nature,
mind/body, reason/emotion, public/private. Law is associated with the
"male" and higher valued side of each of these dualisms. 62 This means
that law adopts the values of the privileged side of the dualisms, such as
the self-interested, "rational" exchange values of the marketplace, or the
shunning of emotion. It also means that legal langauge has few terms for
comprehending in a positive, valuable way the content of the devalued
sides of the dualisms-or those, such as women, who are associated with
the devalued sides. For example, law's operation within a perceived di-
chotomy of public/private, and its preference for the public as the proper
area for its concern, leaves law largely ignorant of and unresponsive to
what happens to women within the private realm. Thus the "public" lan-
guage of law contributes to the silencing of women.
The conflict aspect of legal language-the way it talks about situa-
tions and social problems as matters of conflicting rights or interests-
fosters polarized understandings of issues and limits the ability to under-
stand the other side. It also squeezes out of view other ways of seeing
things, nonoppositional possibilities for dealing with social problems.
Since a language of conflict means that one side has to be preferred,
there will always be winners and losers.63 In a polarized language of hi-
erarchical dualisms set within a patriarchal system, it will often be wo-
men, and their concerns, that will lose, be devalued, or be overlooked in
the race to set priorities and choose sides.
The special treatment/equal treatment debate over pregnancy
leave 64 is one example of conflict-talk that has proved troublesome for
women-they face the danger of losing either way. To insist that women
must be treated equally with men when there is a fundamental way in
which they differ-they become pregnant-can mean that needs associ-
ated with pregnancy are not addressed in the workplace. And to have
one's needs labeled "special" simply because they are not men's needs,
in a society where men's needs are the unstated reference-point for
equality, means any effort to address "special" needs is suspect for vio-
lating equality. Round and round, tugging back and forth go the debat-
ers. Feminists are forced to choose sides, only to be denounced by the
other side. Meanwhile, both labels, equal treatment and special treat-
ment, prop up the assumption that men are the norm. Both views keep
62 For a discussion of the dualisms that structure liberal legal thinking, see A.JAGGAR, supra note
27; F. Olsen, The Sex of Law (unpublished manuscript).
63 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 39 (1985); Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984). In these works, Professor Menkel-Meadow
discusses ways in which the law makes it hard to talk about and achieve win/win solutions.
64 See Finley, Transcending Equality, supra note 22.
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the needs of workers who also have children mired in polarized same-
ness/difference equalify talk. This talk precludes discussing the needs of
pregnant workers as an important human issue of concern to both par-
ents, and as a matter of social responsibility on the part of employers. 65
Another problematic instance of the language of conflicting rights is
the law's approach to issues of women's reproductive freedom. These
issues are being framed by the law as conflicts between maternal rights,
such as the right to privacy and to control one's body, and fetal rights,
such as the right to life, or the right to be born in a sound and healthy
state. They are also framed as conflicts between maternal rights and pa-
ternal rights, such as the man's interest in reproductive autonomy. To
talk about human reproduction as a situation of conflict is a very trouble-
some way to understand this crucial human event in which the well-be-
ing, needs, and futures of all participants in the event, including other
family members, are inextricably, sensitively connected. Just because
everything that happens to one participant can affect the other does not
mean they are in conflict. It suggests, rather, that they are symbiotically
linked. The fetus is not there and cannot exist without the mother. An
action taken for the sake of the mother that may, in a doctor's but not the
mother's view, seem to pose a risk to the fetus, such as her decision to
forego a caesarean birth, or to take medication while pregnant, may actu-
ally be necessary (although perhaps also still presenting a risk of harm)
for the fetus because without an emotionally and physically healthy
mother there cannot be a sustained fetus or child.66
The language of conflicting interests utterly fails to capture the
meaning of the experience of pregnancy to women. 67 The fetus and wo-
man are one, happily or unhappily. As Natalie Merchant of the group
"10,000 Maniacs" sings, a pregnant woman is no longer one separate
person, but now she "eat[s] for two, walk[s] for two, breathe[s] for
two." 68 The liberal notion of an isolated autonomous being with an
existence separate from all others lacks descriptive reality when applied
to pregnant women. 69 If the pregnancy is wanted, many women may feel
an ecstatic connected wholeness with the wonder of their growing body.
The developing fetus is not just part of her; it is her, a seamless web. 70
Whatever is done to or for it, is done to her, not just through her. If the
pregnancy is unwanted, conflict with an opposed autonomous rights
holder still does not encapsulate what many women feel. The feelings
may be of terrifying annihilation, of invasion by and surrender of self to
65 In this paragraph I am summarizing the conclusion of my previous article, see Finley, Tran-
scending Equality, supra note 22. The limitations of legal language for addressing the needs of women
has been a consistent theme in my work.
66 For a work that seeks to approach abortion in terms of the connections between mother and
fetus, see R. GOLDSTEIN, MOTHER LOVE AND ABORTION: A LEGAL INTERPRETATION (1988).
67 For descriptions of this experience as understood by women, and the contrast between wo-
men's experience and the medical-legal understanding, see E. MARTIN, THE WOMAN IN THE BODY: A
CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF REPRODUCTION (1987); Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching, supra note 2.
68 10,000 Maniacs, Eat For Two, on BLIND MAN'S Zoo (Elektra Asylum Records 1989) (words and
lyrics by Natalie Merchant).
69 See West, Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 49.
70 See Ashe, Law-Language of Maternity, supra note 14.
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the pregnancy-not of a fight against a separate being. After terminating
an unwanted pregnancy, a woman does not feel as though she has van-
quished an enemy, but as if she has been given herself back. Overwhelm-
ing relief, a sense of autonomy restored-but sometimes a sense of part
of herself lost as well. 71
If we stop talking about reproductive issues as issues of opposing
interests, but discuss them as matters where the interests of all are always
linked, for better or worse, then there is much less risk that one person in
the equation-the woman-will drop out of the discussion. Yet that is
what often happens in dualistic, win-lose conflict-talk. As one commen-
tator has said, "respect for the fetus is purchased at the cost of denying
the value of women. ' ' 72 This tendency to erase the woman occurs fre-
quently in medical discourse. Several leading obstetrical texts, when dis-
cussing delivery, fail to mention the woman-delivery is described as a
matter between the baby and the doctor and his or her equipment.73
Legal discourse is frequently guided by the male-based medical perspec-
tive, which, when matched with the erasing process of win-lose legal dis-
course, pfishes the mother further into the recesses of invisibility. Dawn
Johnsen offers an insightful analysis of how this process works: "[b]y sep-
arating the interests of the fetus from those of the pregnant woman, and
then examining, often post hoc, the effect on the fetus of isolated deci-
sions made by the woman on a daily'basis during pregnancy, the state is
likely to exaggerate the potential risks to the fetus and undervalue the
costs of the loss of autonomy suffered by the woman." 74 A chilling exam-
ple of the process of obliterating the woman occurred in a case in which a
court ordered a caesarean section performed on a woman over her reli-
gious objections. The mother virtually disappeared from the text, and
certainly her autonomy was of little concern to the court, as the judge
wrote that all that stood between the fetus and "its independent exist-
ence, was, put simply, a doctor's scalpel."'75 The court did not even say
an incision in "the mother." Just "a scalpel"-the mother was not men-
tioned as a person who would be cut by that scalpel, who would have to
undergo risky surgery. She was not mentioned as someone whose health
and existence were necessary to the child's life; she was no more than an
obstacle to the fetus' life. And, in some instances when men challenge
the right of a woman carrying an embryo they helped create to have an
abortion, the woman gets discussed as a barrier to what is in the best
interests of the man and the fetus-having the child-rather than as the
71 The amicus briefs for the National Abortion Rights Action League, et. al., in Thornburgh v.
American Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); and Webster v. Reproductive
Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), recount the experiences of women with unwanted pregnancy
and abortion.
72 Farrel-Smith, Rights-Conflict, Pregnancy and Abortion, in BEYOND DOMINATION: NEw PERSPEC-
TIVES ON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 27 (C. Gould ed. 1983).
73 See E. MARTIN, supra note 67.
74 Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy
and Equal Protection, 95 YALE LJ. 599, 613 (1986).
75 In the Matter of Madyun Fetus, 114 Daily Washington L. Rep. 2233, 2240 (D.C. Super. Ct.
July 26, 1986).
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human being most crucially necessary for and affected by having that
child.76
The legal approach to the problem of pornography as if it presented
a conflict between women's and men's interests in not being objectified
and degraded, and the societal interest in free speech, is another exam-
ple of unproductive conflict-talk which limits our understanding of a
problem and of women's experiences. The equation of not being de-
graded and objectified with the diluted word "interest" is troubling. The
very thought that an abstract principle like free speech could be consid-
ered more important than working against domination, violence, injury,
and degradation, and redressing the needs of those who have suffered
from these things, is also disturbing. Talking about the pornography is-
sue as presenting an inherent conflict with free speech, and thus simply a
matter of balancing the weights of the respective interests, leaves the
meaning and scope to be given to "speech" undiscussed. The conflict-
talk also leaves the framework of free speech law unexamined. Yet the
terms of that framework define moral harm to the consumers of pornog-
raphy, and not physical harm to the people who are used to make it or
are victimized by it, as the appropriate focus of legal concern.77 The
legal rhetoric also squeezes out from the debate the question whether
there really is a conflict between "free speech" and women's civil rights.
The dichotomous, polarized, either/or framework of legal language
also makes it a reductionist language-one that does not easily embrace
complexity or nuance. Something either must be one way, or another. It
cannot be a complicated mix of factors and still be legally digestible. The
difficulty of discrimination law in responding to the situation of black wo-
men is one example. In some cases black women have been told by
courts that they must choose between presenting their claim as a black or
as a woman; they cannot proceed as both simultaneously even though
that is what they are.78 In other cases they have been told they have to
choose between their race and their gender, and must bring their dis-
crimination claims as "sex-plus" claims, or as "race-plus" claims. 79 This
requires assigning a priority to either race or sex as the one principal
factor in their lives, and subordinating the other as an add-on.
Joan Scott's analysis of the way the courtroom discourse twisted and
resisted the complexity of the historians' arguments in the EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. trial is another powerful example of the reductionist ten-
76 See, e.g., Doe v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 1988), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2136; Conn v. Conn,
525 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd me., 526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind.); Lewis v. Lewis, Slip Op. No.
84149 (Mich. Ct. App. September 15, 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Myers v. Lewis, 109 S. Ct. 495. In
each of these cases, the trial courts granted injunctions barring women from obtaining abortions.
The appellate courts overturned the injunctions using an analysis that focused much more on the
women than the analysis used by the respective trial courts. Compare medical language about birth,
which uses metaphors of production and machinery to obliterate the human agency of women. See
E. MARTIN, supra note 67.
77 See Finley, Nature of Domination, supra note 4.
78 See, e.g., DeGraffenreid v. G.M. Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Miss. 1976); Scarbor-
ough, supra note 9.
79 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Ct'y Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980);
Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986).
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dency of legal language.8 0 The reductive insistence of legal language on
a consistent yes/no position, a bottom line simple "answer," denied the
possibility of shifting contexts and the need to resort to different lines of
argument for different purposes. Thus, the efforts of labor historian Al-
ice Kessler-Harris to elucidate the subtle interconnections between op-
tions employers make available to women, family role expectations for
women, and women's own expectations for themselves, were dismissed
in the courtroom. Kessler-Harris was not simply saying it was either all
the employer's "fault" that there were few women hired for commis-
sioned sales jobs, or all women's "free" choices made with reference to
their own "desires," such as being with their families. As Scott explains,
the historians were forced "to swear to the truth or falsehood of interpre-
tive generalizations developed for purposes other than legal contesta-
tion, and they were forced to treat their interpretive premises as matters
of fact."81 Opposing counsel ridiculed Kessler-Harris' efforts to explain
her analysis about interactive effects and conditioned constraints that
make choice illusory as inconsistent with her prior work. In this other
work, however, she was addressing different needs and thus had stressed
more the constraints posed by women's family situations, rather than the
role of employers. The complexity of her argument, her inability to ex-
plain in yes-no terms, was, in the eyes of opposing counsel and the trial
judge, disingenuousness. The historian tried to resist the way the legal
language framed the problem, and the legal language judged her in-
credible. The law has a hard time hearing, or believing, other languages.
That is part of its power.
One of the other languages that the law does not easily hear is that
associated with the emotions, with expression of bursting human passion
and aspirations. Law is a language firmly committed to the "reason" side
of the reason/emotion dichotomy. Indeed, the law distrusts injuries
deemed emotional in character; it suspects them as fraudulent, as
feigned, as not important. The inability to hear the voice of emotion, to
respond to thinking from the emotions, is one of the limitations of the
legal voice. There are some things that just cannot be said by using the
legal voice. Its terms depoliticize, decharge, and dampen. Rage, pain,
elation, the aching, thirsting, hungering for freedom on one's own terms,
love and its joys and terrors, fear, utter frustration at being contained
and constrained by legal language-all are diffused by legal language.
Thus, Derrick Bell resorts to fantasy to express far more powerfully than
reasoned legal analytic language ever could the hope-frustration-tension-
push-gain-get contained relationship between African-Americans and
white american law.8 2 Alice Walker speaks about the ways in which the
term "civil rights" is a bureaucratic, placating term, how the translation
of it by the tongues of some blacks to "silver writes" so much better
expresses the desire to break all boundaries, the desire of a black man
80 See Scott, Deconstructing Equality, supra note 5.
81 Id. at 41.
82 See D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIALJUSTICE (1987); Bell,
Forward: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985).
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"to run naked on a beach ... in Alabama."83 Patricia Williams resorts to
the allegorical and metaphorical signifying language of literature to ex-
press her reality of being a black woman in America, and to express her
relation to the legal system that once saw her family members as the ob-
ject of property law.84 And Audre Lord reminds us that, especially for
women of color, who have been most invisible to and silenced by legal,
analytic and reasoned language, "poetry is not a luxury" but an essential
means of expression, of self-articulation and definition, of survival. 85
Because law is a language of authoritative interpretations, those who
come to it must try to fit their version of events into its terms. But be-
cause legal language is assumed to be legitimate for all, because it under-
stands itself as being aperspectived, it does not even comprehend that
there might be fit or translation problems. Kessler-Harris is not seen
sympathetically by the judge as an historian working with the language of
another discipline trying to explain as best she could within the alien
terms of the law, but as a befuddled, contradictory person whose account
could not be credited at all.
Examples of the "fit" problem can be found throughout law. How
can we fit a woman's experience of living in a world of violent pornogra-
phy into obscenity doctrine, which is focused on moral harm to consum-
ers of pornography?8 6 How can women fit the reality of pregnancy into
equality doctrine without getting hung up on the horns of the sameness-
difference dilemma? How can women fit the difference between a
wanted and an unwanted pregnancy into the doctrinal rhetoric of privacy
and "choice"? 8 7 This rhetoric presumes a sort of isolated autonomy
alien to the reality of a pregnant woman. 88 How can women fit the psy-
chological and economic realities of being a battered woman into crimi-
nal law, which puts the word "domestic" before "violence"? This choice
of terminology reduces the focus on the debilitating effects of violence
and increases attention to the fact that the setting is the home, an envi-
ronment in which we are all supposedly free to come and go as we
"choose." How can women fit the way incest victims repress what has
happened to them until the memory is released by some triggering event
in adulthood with the narrow temporal requirements of statute of limita-
tions law? How can women fit the fact that this crime, and others of
sexualized violence against women, so often happens behind closed
doors with no "objective witnesses," into the proof requirements of evi-
dentiary law? How, as Kristin Bumiller explores in her article, Rape as a
Legal Symbol An Essay on Sexual Violence and Racism,89 can we fit the experi-
ence of having what a woman thought was a pleasant social interaction
83 A. WALKER, Silver Vi'tes, in IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS' GARDENS: WOMANIST PROSE 335
(1983).
84 Williams, On Being the Object of Property, 14 SIGNS:J. WOMEN IN CULT. & Soc'Y 5 (1988).
85 A. LORDE, Poetry is Not a Luxury, in SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 36 (1984).
86 See, e.g., Finley, Nature of Domination, supra note 4.
87 See, e.g., Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching, supra note 2.
88 See West, WVomen's Hedonic Lives, supra note 49. Cf A. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR
WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988) (examination of how prevalent rationales for privacy fail to capture
the reasons why women need privacy in their lives).
89 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75 (1988).
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but then crosses the invisible line to become threatening violence, into
rape doctrine? Rape law focuses on sex, not on violence. It focuses on
the woman's consent to sex, from the male point of view-and so it
presumes that any indication of assent to social interaction is also assent
to "do what the man wants." 90 How, as Lucie White asks in her paper,
Unearthing the Barriers to Women's Speech: Notes Toward a Feminist Sense of Pro-
cedural Justice, 91 can a black mother on welfare ever convey her world to
the welfare bureaucracy that is charging her with an overpayment be-
cause she followed its erroneous advice and spent an injury insurance
check? What is important to this woman is that she did nothing wrong,
and that she was able to buy her children Sunday shoes. But what is
relevant to the state's welfare law is not her view of right and wrong, or
her own understanding of what was necessary for her family-in her
world, having Sunday shoes was essential to human dignity-but whether
the items she bought with the insurance check fit the state's definition of
"necessities" of life.92
Legal language frames the issues, it defines the terms in which
speech in the legal world must occui, it tells us how we should under-
stand a problem and which explanations are acceptable and which are
not. Since this language has been crafted primarily by white men, the
way it frames issues, the way it defines problems, and the speakers and
speech it credits,' do not readily include women. Legal language com-
mands: abstract a situation from historical, social, and political context;
be "objective" and avoid the lens of nonmale experience; invoke univer-
sal principles such as "equality" and "free choice;" speak with the voice
of dispassionate reason; be simple, direct, and certain; avoid the com-
plexity of varying, interacting perspectives and overlapping multi-tex-
tured explanations; and most of all, tell it and see it "like a man"-put it
in terms that relate to men and to which men can relate.
Feminist theory, on the -other hand, which is not derived from look-
ing first to law, but rather to the multiple experiences and voices of wo-
men as the frame of reference, tells us to look at things in their historical,
social, and political context, including power and gender; distrust ab-
stractions and universal rules, because "objectivity" is really perspectived
and abstractions just hide the 'biases; question everything, especially the
norms or assumptions implicit in received doctrine, question the content
and try to redefine the boundaries;93 distrust attributions of essential dif-
ference and acknowledge that experiences of both men and women are
multiple, diverse, overlapping and thus difference itself may not be a rel-
evant legal criterion;94 break down hierarchies of race, gender, or power;
embrace diversity, complexity, and contradiction-give up on the need
90 See S. ESTRICH, supra note 44.
91 See L. White, supra note 26.
92 Id. at 2-12, 50-52.
93 For a discussion of how examining women's situations and then applying them to law requires
changing disciplinary boundaries and creating wholly new disciplines, see Norwegian Law Professor
Tove Stang-Dahl's description of the Women's Law program at the University of Oslo in Norway.
Stang-Dahl, Taking Women as a Starting Point. Building Women's Law, 14 INT'LJ. Soc. OF L. 239 (1986).
94 See, e.g., Scott, Deconstructing Equality, supra note 5.
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to tell "one true story" because it is too likely that that story will be the
story of the dominant group;95 listen to the voice of "emotion" as well as
the voice of reason and learn to value and legitimate what has been deni-
grated as "mere emotion." 9 6
III. Dealing With the Dilemma of Legal Language
So, what's a woman do? Give up on law, on legal language entirely?
Disengage from the legal arena of the struggle? Neither of these strate-
gies is really an available option. We cannot get away from law, even if
that is what we would like to do. As Sandra Harding has said, "[w]e do
not imagine giving up speaking or writing just because our language is
deeply androcentric; nor do we propose an end to theorizing about social
life once we realize that thoroughly androcentric perspectives inform
even our feminist revisions of the social theories we inherit." 97 Because
law is such a powerful, authoritative language, one that insists that to be
heard you try to speak its language, we cannot pursue the strategy sug-
gested by theorists from other disciplines such as the French feminists, of
devising a new woman's language that rejects "phallologocentric"
discourse. 98
Nor can we abandon caring whether law hears us. Whether or not
activists for women look to law as one means for pursuing change, the
law will still operate on and affect women's situations. Law will be pres-
ent through direct regulation, through nonintervention when interven-
tion is needed, and through helping to keep something invisible when
visibility and validation are needed.99 Law will continue to reflect and
shape prevailing social and individual understandings of problems, and
thus will continue to play a role in silencing and discrediting women.
95 For example, white feminists tend to tell a story of women's true situation that excludes the
differing situations of poor women and women of color and women of different ethnic backgrounds.
For developments of this critique of white feminism by other white feminists, see E. SPELMAN, INES-
SENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1989); Kline, Race, Racism, and
Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115 (1989).
96 For examples of work that seeks to value the voice of caring, see C. GILLIGAN, supra note 27;
N. NODDINGS, CARING-A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (1984); S. RUD-
DICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE (1989); Bender, supra note 33; and Tronto,
Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care, 12 SIGNS:J. WOMEN IN CULT. & Soc'y 644 (1987).
The elements of feminist theory I have laid out in this paragraph are themselves not universal
characteristics of a unified, universal feminist theory. They are the elements of where I am at in my
feminist thinking about law, drawn from many sources. Some of my more post-modernist, post-
structuralist claims will be particularly controversial, but I have found feminist works from this intel-
lectual movement most helpful to my thinking about the nature of law and how we can work to
change its meanings. See, e.g., S. HARDING, SCIENCE QUESTION, supra note 46; Flax, Postmodernism and
Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, 12 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULT. & SoC'Y 621 (1987); Scott, Deconstruct-
ing Equality, supra note 5.
97 S. HARDING, SCIENCE QUESTION, supra note 46, at 10.
98 For examples of the French feminist theory, see L. IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH is NOT ONE (C.
Porter trans. 1985), and SPECULUM OF THE OTHER WOMAN (G. Gill trans. 1985); Cixous, Laugh of the
Medusa, in NEw FRENCH FEMINISMS, supra note 28. Note that one of the French feminist language
theorists, Julia Kristeva, proposes critical engagement with the existing language as a way to change
it. See Nye, Woman Clothed with the Sun, supra note 1.
99 For a discussion of these three ways in which law intervenes, even when it is not seeming to do
so, see K. O'DONOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN LAw 11-19 (1985); see also Olsen, The Myth of State Inter-
vention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985).
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Since law inevitably will be one of the important discourses affecting
the status of women, we must engage it. We must pursue trying to bring
more of women's experiences, perspectives, and voices into law in order
to empower women and help legitimate these experiences. But this is
not as easy as it sounds, because there is no "one truth" of women's
experiences, and women's own understandings of their experiences are
themselves affected by legal categorizations.
To the extent that the law's authoritative definitions are based on
male perspectives, much of women's own understandings of things
whose meaning is greatly influenced by legal definitions-such as rape or
equality-will be constructed with reference to the male meanings. So
the feminist project of incorporating "women's experience" into legal
definitions is not as simple as "one, figure out who or what is 'women';
two, consult women's experience; and three, add it to law and stir." Wo-
men's experiences are diverse and often contradictory; and there is no
true women's experience unaffected by social construction, which in-
cludes legal construction, which includes male defined understandings.
How many women have thought of themselves as not having been
"raped," when they know that what happened to them did not match the
legal definition of rape which informs the social understanding of
rape?100 How many women have thought of themselves as not victims of
discrimination when the law says they are different because they are
pregnant or capable of becoming pregnant, or subject to greater health
risks, or too short, or not strong enough, or working in jobs and at rates
of pay they have freely chosen to accept, or not reacting to workplace
"horseplay" (manplay)101 the way a reasonable "person" would?'
The answer to both questions is many, some, but not all, and not the
many or some totally. There may be instances of dissonance, of resist-
ance, and of wondering if the legal definition is really right. A woman
may still feel violated and coerced even though she was not "raped," and
she may begin to wonder if maybe feeling violated and coerced is so
much like being raped that she was raped even though she knew the man
and agreed to go to his room. A woman may still feel that she was
treated unfairly or was not really given any choice or was expected to
accept something that really disturbed her or hurt her, and that all this
was because she had no power. She may then begin to suspect that the
lack of power, and thus the way she was treated has something to do with
the fact that she is a woman, and she may wonder whether maybe this is
what discrimination is really all about anyway. The dissonances, resis-
tances, and wonderings are also part of women's experiences. Once they
are articulated and shared with other women, understandings often be-
100 The title of Robin Warshaw's study for Ms. Magazine of date and acquaintance rape, I NEVER
CALLED IT RAPE: THE Ms. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING, AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAIN-
TANCE RAPE (1988), is instructive. See infra note 103.
101 Horseplay is a particularly inappropriate term. Horses at play nuzzle and nip, but they also
definitely know the difference between a playful, welcomed/welcoming nip, and a "keep away from
me" bite or kick. Horses do not sexually harass each other. So, we should stop calling such work-
place behavior horseplay, or child's play, and call it the "play" of the only group that thinks it is an
amusing game-men.
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gin to change. 10 2 Legal activists can explore these voices of dissonance,
these barely audible questions. They can embrace the fact that women
have many very different experiences and can start working into the law
the questions raised by women's challenges to the prevailing legal con-
structions of situations. For example, as women themselves started to
talk to each other about experiences of violently coerced sex on dates,
and these women talked to other women who had been raped in the con-
ventional sense, the similarities between the way their experience made
them feel and the recognized rape became apparent. And so they began
to question whether maybe they, too, had been "raped." This opening
in women's understandings is now being used to change the legal under-
standing of rape as something that only happens between strangers. t0 3
In engaging the law over the meaning of women's experiences, peo-
ple representing women must remain constantly critically aware of the
dilemma of legal language, of its simultaneous power and limitations.
While its power can help women by validating and affecting societal con-
sciousness about women's situations, its power also has a negative as-
pect. Precisely because it is an authoritative discourse, it demands that
we try to speak within its confines-it threatens us with not being heard
or credited if we do not. The patriarchal bias in legal language, and its
limited way of framing and envisioning situations, can easily distort what
women have to say. It can put women on the defensive, because of their
"difference" from men. It can force women to respond to same-
ness/difference arguments, public/private arguments, or free speech ar-
guments, not on women's own terms, but on the terms of the traditional
arguments. This creates a stark dilemma: in light of the power of ex-
isting meanings, can we change the meanings of terms while still using
those terms?
By talking about family/work conflicts, are we helping to reinforce
the view of these two worlds as separate spheres? Are we continuing to
privilege the existing definition of work, and are we shoring up the no-
tion of family as two opposite sex parents, with some number of chil-
dren? By using the term "equality," are we helping to keep the focus on
women and their differences from men, thus reinforcing the male norm?
Or is it possible to use this term in a way that makes women's exper-
iences the reference point, 0 4 and shifts attention to structures and val-
ues of the workplace?' 0 5 Even if we modify "rape" with "date" or
''acquaintance," are we leaving unchallenged the baggage that comes
102 This was the essential philosophy of the feminist methodology of consciousness raising. See,
e.g., A. SHREVE, WOMEN TOGETHER, WOMEN ALONE: THE LEGACY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESs-RAISING
MOVEMENT (1989). Catherine MacKinnon posits consciousness raising as the cornerstone of femi-
nist methodology, see SIGNS I, supra note 27.
103 See, e.g., R. WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE, supra note 100; S. ESTRICH, supra note 44.
104 Justice Marshall's opinion in California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272
(1987), does, to a significant extent, use women's needs as the reference point for the equality analy-
sis, which certainly suggests that it is possible to do so. See Minow, supra note 7. Despite its analyti-
cal progress, the Cal-Fed opinion still keeps us locked in a comparative, dichotomized view of
differences, and it still defines differences themselves as the relevant issue.
105 For suggestions of how this shift in emphasis might be accomplished, see Finley, Transcending
Equality, supra note 22; Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination
Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 79 (1989).
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along with the "r" word-that this is a crime of sex, in which women's
consent is the main issue, rather than a crime of violence in which the
violator's conduct is the issue?' 06 If we capitulate to the language of pri-
vate choice in the abortion debate, are we losing sight of the reasons
why, beyond privacy and choice, control over one's reproductive destiny
is so essential to women's position in a society of male domination? 107
Are we leaving ourselves wide-open to the moral high ground of the
term "pro-life" when all we can juxtapose against it is "choice," rather
than freedom and equality? The word "choice" can seem as trivial as the
color of one's clothes or one's preferred brand of car, when it is life that
some say they are fighting for.
There have been examples of promising word changes and conse-
quent meaning changes in legal discourse. Consider the now widespread
use of the term "sexual harassment," for what used to be considered a
tort of invading individual dignity or sensibilities; the term "battering"
for domestic violence. But even these language changes get confined by
the legal frameworks into which they are placed. For example, the indi-
vidualistic and comparative discrimination framework now applied to
sexual harassment leaves some judges wondering about bisexual supervi-
sors as a means to deny that discrimination is what is occurring. 10 8 The
contract model of damages in discrimination law means that the dignity
and personal identity values that tort law once recognized often go un-
dercompensated.' 09 And the use of the term "sexual assault" in place of
'"rape" in some rape reform statutes has not obviated the problems of
"objective" male-perspectived judgments of female sexuality and
consent. 110-
It is not my purpose to offer a simple, neat, for all times solution to
the dilemma of legal language. Indeed, to even think that is possible
would be contradictory to my message-it would be a capitulation to the
legal ways of thinking that I seek to destabilize in order to expand. But I
am not without solutions to the dilemma of the gendered nature of legal
reasoning. The message of this Article presents one solution: critical
awareness of the dilemma is itself important. Awareness encourages
thinking critically about whose perspective has informed a term or doc-
trine, and about the norms or assumptions upon which the term may
rest. This leads to self-conscious strategic thinking about the philosophi-
cal and political implications of the meanings and programs we do en-
106 See, e.g., Bumiller, Rape as a Legal Symbol, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75 (1988); S. ESTRICH, supra note
44.
107 See, e.g., MacKinnon's discussion ofwhy abortion is an equality issue, not a privacy issue. See,
C. MACKINNON, supra note 23, at 93-102.
108 See, e.g. ,Judge Bork's dissenting opinion in Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
109 See, e.g., SchoenheiderA Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 1461 (1986).
110 See, e.g., E. SHEEHY, PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND THE CRIMINAL LAw: EMERGING ISSUES FOR WO-
MEN, BACKGROUND PAPER FOR THE CANADIAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 19-28
(Sept. 1987); Bienen, Rape III-National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 170 (1980); Dawson, Legal Structures: A Feminist Critique of Sexual Assault Reform, 14 RESOURCES
FOR FEMINIST RESEARCH No. 3 at p. 42 (Nov. 1985); Boyle, Sexual Assault and the Feminist Judge, 1 CAN.
J. WOMEN & L. 99 (1985).
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dorse."I For example, just what are the implications of arguing either
sameness or difference? If both have negative implications, then this
should suggest the need to reframe the issue, to ask previously unasked
questions about the relevance or stability of differences," 2 or about the
role of unexamined players such as employers and workplace structures
and norms. Critical thinking about norms and what they leave unexam-
ined opens up conversations about altering the norms and thus the vi-
sion of the problem. This leads to thinking about new ways of reasoning
and talking. It leads to offering new definitions of existing terms; defini-
tions justified by explorations of context and the experiences of previ-
ously excluded voices. Or, it leads to thinking about offering wholly new
terms.
In addition to critical engagement with the nature of legal language,
another promising strategy is to sow the mutant seeds that do exist
within legal reasoning. My previous description of legal reasoning is ob-
viously overly general. It highlights tendencies or widely held assump-
tions about the nature of law. But this description, too, can be
deconstructed. For example, while law is generally ahistorical and ab-
stract in its highest pronouncements of doctrine, it is also a fact-driven
system, one that works with and exploits variations between situations." 3
Because legal reasoning can be sensitive to context, we can work to ex-
pand the context that it deems relevant. By pulling the contextual
threads of legal language, we can work towards making law more com-
fortable with diversity and complexity, less wedded to the felt need for
universalizing, reductive principles.
The law's oft-proclaimed values of equity and fairness can also work
as mutating agents. The equity side of law counsels taking individual
variations and needs into account. Arguments about when this should be
done in order to achieve fairness must proceed with reference to context,
to differing perspectives, and to differing power positions. The more we
can find openings to argue from the perspective of those often over-
looked by legal language, such as the people upon whom the legal power
is being exercised, or those disempowered or silenced or rendered invisi-
ble by the traditional discourse,1 14 the more the opportunities to use the
engine of fairness and equity to expand the comprehension of legal
language.
11I See, e.g., Scott, Deconstructing Equality, supra note 5, at 36.
112 See id. at 45; Finley, Transcending Equality, supra note 22.
113 For example, some aspects of the doctrinal deconstruction engaged by some critical legal
theorists are simply very good legal reasoning, or playing the "what about, what if" game of law
professors very, very well.
114 See Minow, supra note 7.
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